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VAN BERKUM 
One of the major puzzles in pragmatics is how listeners and readers seemingly effortlessly go 
beyond linguistically coded meaning to arrive at what the speaker had actually meant to convey. 
Part of this puzzle is that, whereas linguists have lots of time to ponder possible interpretations, 
much of the everyday pragmatic computation has to be over and done with after a second or so. In 
conversation, even just waiting until the end of the utterance is no option -- the dynamics of turn-
taking are such that you'd better work out the speaker's point before he or she is done (De Ruiter, 
Mitterer & Enfield, 2006). To understand the processing machinery behind such highly incremental 
interpretation requires the use of measures that can track cognitive operations rapidly, as they 
unfold. It is largely for this reason that experimental pragmatics is turning to self-paced reading, 
eye tracking, and, more recently, EEG.  
 
As might be expected, the handful of pragmatically inspired EEG experiments to date usually 
address hot topics in pragmatics, such as scalar implicatures (e.g., Noveck & Posada, 2003) or 
negation (e.g., Nieuwland & Kuperberg, in press). Furthermore, there is growing interest in EEG 
traces of superficially rich ‘non-literal’ uses of language, such as irony or metaphors (e.g., Coulson, 
2004). For a young (actually, a baby) discipline such as neurocognitive pragmatics, focussing on 
currently hot pragmatic issues makes eminent sense. On the other hand, whenever there’s language, 
there’s pragmatics, right? That is, presumably even the most simple declarative statement requires 
some pragmatic processing for its interpretation.  
 
In this chapter, I review my EEG research on comprehending ’simple’ sentences in context. This 
work, conducted with many collaborators, did not originate in pragmatic theory, but arose out of a 
desire to scale up the neurocognition of language to somewhat more complex arenas of language 
use. Largely due to constraints on neuroimaging designs, the typical paradigm in this field is one in 
which participants read a simple declarative sentence amidst many other unrelated ones flashed by 
on the ERP lab’s computer monitor. Alternatively, they hear a list of unrelated spoken sentences 
pronounced by a deliberately unobtrusive, invisible speaker. We know that even in such 
impoverished situations people tend to process for meaning, and this has allowed the field to make 
progress on various aspects of sentence-level interpretation. At the same time, however, it will be 
obvious that pragmatic questions about how sentence meaning is modulated, enriched, possibly 
even co-defined by extra-sentential context cannot easily be addressed in the standard paradigm.  
 
The review is organized around four questions: (1) When and how do extra-sentential factors (e.g., 
the prior text, identity of the speaker, value system of the comprehender) affect the incremental 
sentence interpretation processes indexed by the so-called N400 component of the ERP? (2) When 
and how do people identify the referents for expressions such as “he” or “the review”, and how do 
referential processes interact with sense and syntax? (3) How directly pragmatic are the 
interpretation-relevant ERP effects reported here? (4) Do readers and listeners anticipate upcoming 
information? Here, I focus on pragmatically relevant ERP findings and their implications for 
theories of language understanding. For a tutorial review of the more technical ins and outs of using 
ERPs to study language comprehension in discourse contexts, see Van Berkum (2004). 
 
 
(1) MAKING SENSE OF WORDS 
 
Text as context 
 
ERP research on utterance interpretation took off with the discovery of the N400 effect, a negative 
deflection in the ERP that emerged around 250 milliseconds after a written nonsensical word and 
peaked at about 400 ms, with a maximum over the back of the head. (e.g., “He spread the warm 
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bread with socks”; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). Because this specific effect was not elicited by a 
typographic anomaly (“He spread the warm bread with BUTTER”) or a syntactic anomaly (“He 
spread the warm bread with besides”), it was taken to reflect some aspect of how words are related 
to their interpretive context1. Follow-up experiments soon confirmed this, and made clear that 
N400 effects actually reflected graded modulations of an underlying N400 component, elicited by 
every content word, with an amplitude that increases to the extent that the word is less easy to 
integrate into the sentence-semantic context (see Kutas, Van Petten & Kluender, 2006, for review).  
 
*** figure 1 about here *** 
 
In our first ERP study on context-dependent interpretation (Van Berkum, Hagoort & Brown, 1999) 
we asked if words that were nonsensical with respect to the prior text (e.g., “promote” in Figure 1), 
rather than the local sentence, would elicit the same N400 effect. Of course, the answer had to be 
yes – after all, why would the processing consequences of the anomalies in “The lecturer had 
committed plagiarism. He was promoted” and in “The lecturer that had committed plagiarism was 
promoted” be fundamentally different? And indeed, discourse-dependent and ‘sentence-internal’ 
semantic anomalies elicited the exact same N400 effect, at the same time.  
 
A spoken-language replication of this expected result (Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Brown & 
Hagoort, 2003) did drive home another point: the wider interpretive context – now in the easily 
manipulable form of a prior text – is brought to bear on utterance understanding extremely rapidly. 
That is, with spoken words, the brain responds to the fit between word and wider context well 
before people have actually heard the end of the word. So, in the example of Figure 1, hearing 
something as short as "pro..." rather than "sa..." is already enough for an N400 effect to begin to 
emerge, even though none of these strings by itself pins down a specific word.   
 
Important, the N400 effect is not a simple anomaly detector. Every content word elicits an N400 
component, which decreases in size when the word fits the context better, in a graded way. For 
example, relative to a coherent word like “sack”, an equally coherent but somewhat less expected 
word like “report” also elicits a larger N400 (Otten & Van Berkum, 2007; see also Figure 5 for an 
example). The implication is that in contrast to a recent suggestion (Geurts, in press), we can take 
these ERP modulations to reflect something about the normal computations involved in 
understanding sentences in context. In section 3, I examine what that ‘something’ might be. 
 
Two follow-up projects refined our understanding of discourse-dependent N400 effects. First, in an 
experiment in which we controlled for the impact of specific prime words (e.g., ‘plagiarism’ 
directly activating ‘to sack’ in lexical memory; Otten & Van Berkum, 2007), we showed that text-
dependent N400 effects cannot simply be explained by basic word-to-word associative priming, 
and that at least part of the effect critically hinges on the exact message conveyed by the prior text. 
Second, when we pitted a cartoon-like discourse context against local sentence-internal animacy 
constraints, by for example embedding “the peanut was in love” in a cartoon-like discourse context 
featuring an amorous peanut, the discourse-supported but animacy-violating critical predicate “in 
love” elicited a smaller N400 than an animacy-respecting but discourse-inappropriate alternative 
predicate “salted” (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006a), showing that in this case, discourse-
contextual fit completely overruled local animacy requirements in driving the N400. This is not to 
say that real-world constraints cannot have their own, independent effect on N400 amplitude (e.g., 
Federmeier & Kutas, 1999). However, in coherent discourse, the N400 is usually highly sensitive to 
                                                 
1 In psycholinguistic ERP papers, interpretation is often referred to as ‘semantic processing’, typically without taking a 
stance on whether the phenomena at hand involve linguistic semantics (coded meaning) or pragmatics (the rest).  
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how things fit what is being talked about right now, even if it happens to be some imaginary world 
with happy peanuts, donkeys, or unicorns.  
 
The speaker as context 
 
Many theorists have pointed out that the computation of what is said (the proposition expressed) is 
not a strictly semantic affair, and requires pragmatic input (e.g., Clark, 1996; Levinson, 2000). One 
of the most obvious examples is indexical resolution, in which the expression is anchored to a basic 
set of pragmatic indices (or deictic parameters) which include the particular speaker, the 
addressee(s), and the time and place of utterance. In a recent ERP experiment (Van Berkum, Van 
den Brink, Tesink, Kos, & Hagoort, 2008), we explored when and how knowing who the speaker is 
impacts on the understanding of an unfolding sentence. In the study, people heard utterances whose 
content sometimes did not match probabilistic inferences supported by the speaker’s voice, as in 
sentence (1) in a female voice, (2) in an adult voice, and (3) delivered with an ‘upper-class’ accent. 
 
 (1) I always rent movies with lots of violence in them. 
 (2) On Saturday I spent the whole afternoon playing marbles on the street. 
 (3) I have a big tattoo on my back. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, speaker-inconsistent critical words (in italics for expository purposes only) 
elicited a small but reliable N400 effect, beginning at 200-300 milliseconds from acoustic word 
onset. This reveals that listeners rapidly classify speakers on the basis of their voices, and anchor 
the utterance to the speaker immediately, somehow using their knowledge of the speaker’s probable 
sex, age, and social stratum to evaluate the plausibility of what is being asserted.  
 
*** figure 2 about here *** 
 
Because the large majority of our items hinged on defeasible social stereotypes about what speakers 
of a certain age, sex and social stratum are likely to do (and say about themselves), and because the 
exact relevant aspect of that stereotype became apparent at the critical word only, the result also 
suggests that relevant assumptions about the speaker can be brought to bear on language processing 
extremely rapidly, even in very open-ended situations (e.g., “I have a big…”). In section 4, I 
discuss how basic long-term memory mechanisms might help out here.2 
 
Personal values as context 
 
In everyday language use, people don’t just derive propositions and construct situation models, 
they also often care about what’s being asserted or implied. So, when Herb Clark expresses “I’m 
hot” in a card game with his son (Clark, 1997), Herb’s son is probably not just inferring that he’s 
about to lose – he’ll also have certain feelings about this. If he strongly values winning, he may feel 
bad, but if he had decided he was finally going to let his poor dad win for once, he may actually 
feel great.  
 
The traditional demarcation lines in cognitive science define all of the latter as post-perceptual, 
post-inferential consequences of computing statement and speaker meaning. So why care about 
them in a paper on language understanding? The critical assumption that justifies this perspective is 
that processes involved in language interpretation are insensitive to how the listener might feel 
                                                 
2 What happens in, say, “And then my wife said: ‘I am pregnant because I feel sick’ ” spoken in a deep male voice is as 
yet unknown. Because the N400 is also sensitive so more shallow ‘primes’ in the context (see section 3), I suspect that 
such narrative layering will attenuate but not necessarily entirely eliminate the N400 effect. 
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about certain things: these processes are just delivering the message for other neural systems to 
work with. But what if this assumption is wrong? What if how we feel about things can actually 
influence the way in which we extract the message? Or, more radically, what if the affective 
valence of, say, a tarantula spider, a cute-looking kitten, suicide bombers or euthanasia is part of the 
meaning of the concept? Good and bad is rooted in relevance to survival and well-being (Damasio, 
2004; Cacioppo, Larsen, Smith & Berntson, 2004) – in my view, this makes valence a prime 
candidate for the set of ‘semantic primitives’. Furthermore, if the valence of concepts is stored as 
part of their meaning (cf. Morris, Squires, Taber & Lodge, 2003), the affective valuation of an 
unfolding statement becomes an integral part of computing its meaning.3   
 
One problem in systematically exploring these issues is that because language, valence and the 
associated feelings/emotions are studied in relatively unconnected disciplines, there is little theory 
that connects the three. Another problem is that it is not so easy to find arenas of language use in 
which the interaction between language and valence can be studied systematically. To explore these 
matters (Van Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, submitted), we recorded EEG as two 
groups of respondents with opposing moral value systems filled out an opinion poll on morally 
relevant issues. Critical statements were designed to be strongly consistent or inconsistent with the 
average moral value system of members of a relatively strict Dutch Christian party, referred to here 
as SC-group respondents. Examples (with the critical word in italics for expository purposes):  
 
(4) I think euthanasia is an acceptable course of action 
(5) Watching TV to relax is wrong in my opinion 
(6) If my child were homosexual, I’d find this easy to accept.  
 
We presented these statements to SC-group respondents and to non-Christian respondents with 
sufficiently contrasting moral value systems (NC-group), and asked them to indicate their 
agreement on a four-point “agree” – “disagree” scale. We measured EEG during initial reading 
only, before any response was given. 
 
*** figure 3 about here *** 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3, words where the statement began to clash with the reader’s moral value 
system (e.g., for SC-group respondents, “I think euthanasia is an acceptable…”) elicited an 
immediate brain response, starting at 200 milliseconds after the morally offending word. Part of the 
neural response was an ERP effect commonly elicited by emotionally arousing stimuli (the so-
called Late Positive Potential, Cacioppo, Crites, Berntson & Coles, 1993). The result of interest 
here, however, is that for both groups of respondents, morally offending words also elicited a small 
N400 effect, with a classic centroparietal maximum, and peaking at exactly 400 milliseconds. This 
suggests that a person’s values are not just brought to bear on language processing extremely 
rapidly, but that the associated affective evaluation actually modulates some aspect of the language-
driven early semantic analysis itself.  
 
What is going on here, and why should this be of interest to pragmatics? One possibility is that 
strongly value-inconsistent words rapidly deliver an unpleasant message, and as such briefly trigger 
                                                 
3 With something like euthanasia valued very differently by different people, this admits a degree of subjectivity in 
meaning that semanticists might not feel very comfortable with. Note, however, that speaker meaning also involves 
subjective factors (e.g., given what I know about so-and-so, our common ground and goals, what might he or she have 
meant?). More generally, all mental representations are in the end subjective. Of course, linguistic communication 
owes its success to a sufficiently shared code, as well as to a mutually shared recognition of that fact. But whether the 
brain's initial sense-making operations heed the difference between intersubjectively supported meaning and more 
'private' aspects of meaning remains to be seen.  
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a more extensive semantic analysis (see Holt, Lynn & Kuperberg, in press, for a comparable 
interpretation). Such rapid feedback from downstream affective valuation to initial ‘cold’ 
interpretation should be of interest to anybody working on language understanding. A more radical 
possibility is that, if valence is part of a concept’s core meaning, valence-dependent clashes are 
unexpected or odd – and therefore complicate the basic sense-making process – in the same way as 
“He spread the warm bread with socks”. Note that the latter brings person-dependent valence right 
into the semantics, if you will – a possibility that should engage pragmaticists and semanticists. 
 
At this point, we cannot rule out a somewhat more mundane possibility: to the extent that a 
respondent indexically resolves these statements to him- or herself (“I think that…”), value-
inconsistent words may also render the statement ‘False’ for the respondent at this point, which 
would briefly intensify or complicate the incremental sense-making process (cf. Fishler, Bloom, 
Childers, Arroyo & Perry, 1984; Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen & Petersson, 2004). But whatever the 
answer might be, the current N400 effect reveals an immediate impact of personal values on early 
sense-making in language. Furthermore, because people can expect to read many statements they 
will not agree with in an opinion poll, we are apparently dealing with a relatively autonomous, non-
controlled brain response. Such compulsory language-value interaction can be taken to challenge 
the classic cognitive science idea that interpretation and valuation are neatly separated.  
 
 
(2) IDENTIFYING DISCOURSE REFERENTS 
 
The Nref effect 
 
As might have been expected for a process as complex as language interpretation, the N400 is not 
the only game in town. A second pragmatics-relevant ERP effect, associated with establishing 
reference, first showed up in a study that examined the interaction between pragmatic factors and 
syntactic parsing (Van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999a). In this study, we embedded sentences 
with a critical singular definite NP, such as “The dean told the lecturer…”, in a wider discourse 
that had either introduced a single referent (e.g., one lecturer), or that had made available two 
equally salient referents (e.g. two lecturers). As illustrated in the left part of Figure 1, referentially 
ambiguous written nouns elicited a characteristic relatively long-lasting negativity right at the 
ambiguous word, emerging at about 300 milliseconds over the front of the head.  
 
Several follow-up studies revealed that referentially ambiguous spoken nouns, spoken pronouns 
and written pronouns all elicited the same sustained frontal negativity or Nref effect (see Van 
Berkum, Koornneef, Otten, & Nieuwland, 2007, for review). Furthermore, the phenomenon reflects 
a relatively smart mechanism: in a context in which, say, one of the two mentioned lecturers has 
just fled from the building, “The dean told the lecturer” does not elicit the effect, even though the 
episodic memory of the discourse does contain two lecturers (Nieuwland, Otten, & Van Berkum, 
2007). The relatively rapid onset of these effects, at ~300-400 ms after noun or pronoun onset, in 
mid-sentence, indicates that readers and listeners rapidly and incrementally try to resolve referential 
expressions. Furthermore, because the Nref effect is a sustained shift that is largest over the front of 
the head, and as such clearly different from the N400 effect, we can infer that different aspects of 
language interpretation are handled by at least partly different networks in the brain (see 
Nieuwland, Petersson, & Van Berkum, 2007, for fMRI evidence confirming this). 
 
Important, the Nref effect displayed in Figure 1 also emerges in entirely felicitous sentences where 
the referentially ambiguous noun is followed by a post-nominal restrictive relative clause (“…the 
lecturer that had committed plagiarism…”). Such constructions are neither uncommon nor deeply 
 6 
THE NEUROPRAGMATICS OF ‘SIMPLE’ UTTERANCE COMPREHENSION – AN ERP REVIEW 
problematic; as with many other ambiguities in language, the one at hand is temporary, arising out 
of the workings of an eager left-to-right incremental processing system. Thus, rather than indexing 
a non-representative response to an anomaly, the Nref effect is reflecting the brain’s natural 
inclination to immediately relate every shred of new information to what is known already.  
 
With this analysis in hand, the difference between how the brain handles an unexpected word (like 
“The dean shot the lecturer”) and how it handles an insufficiently specific referential expression 
(like “The dean sacked the lecturer” with two equally eligible lecturers in context) provides an 
interesting constraint on models of understanding. One thing it rules out, for example, is the simple 
notion that all problems with interpretation would send the comprehender into the same type of 
Gricean inferencing (evidenced by, say, the N400), to try to reconstruct why the speaker is not 
being more cooperative. 
 
The Nref findings also have a clear implication for the dominant semantic-pragmatic theory on 
resolving referential expressions, Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle, 1993; Geurts 
& Beaver, 2007). In particular, since DRT is concerned with how mental representations are 
modified by, and provide a context for, a specific utterance, our findings indicate that in the context 
of 7a and its schematic DRT representation 7b, the variables v and w in a subsequently unfolding 
utterance 8b are linked to 7b immediately, without awaiting the remainder of the sentence. That is, 
the incoming information is linked to prior DRSs on a word-by-word basis. 
 
(7a)  In dismay, the faculty dean called the two lecturers to his office. This was because one of them had 
committed plagiarism, and the other one had faked some of his research data. 
(7b) [x, y, z; dean(x), lexturer(y), lecturer(z), dismayed(x), …] 
 
(8a) The dean told the lecturer… 
(8b) [v, w; dean(v), lecturer(w), told(v,w…)…] 
 
Furthermore, as shown by Nieuwland, Otten & Van Berkum (2007), the processes that immediately 
try to resolve w are not blindly sensitive to the formal availability of […x, y; lecturer(x), 
lecturer(y)…], but immediately take into account which antecedents are really available. What this 
might tell us about the direct source of the Nref effect is an issue we briefly return to in section 3. 
 
How does reference interact with sense? 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the above Nref observations also reveal that fixing the referent for some 
referential expression is constrained by the sense of the critical word at hand (e.g., “lecturer”). This 
is in line with standard thinking about reference resolution, according to which syntax and coded 
word meanings initially determine specific configurations of word senses (“the lecturer”, “a 
lecturer”), and referential processing is at least in part conditional upon the result. Additional 
support for this idea come from the relative timings of the Nref and N400 effects. Word-elicited 
N400 effects almost always have a relatively crisp onset somewhere between 150-300 ms, rise 
steeply until 400-500 ms, and typically return to baseline around 800-1000 ms. The Nref effects 
observed sofar typically begin to develop around 300-400 ms (sometimes much later), and they are 
much more sustained voltage shifts or ‘slow waves’, without a sharp peak, and often lasting to at 
least 1200 ms (see, e.g., Figure 1). This relative timing seems to make sense.4 
 
                                                 
4 Let me reemphasize: in spite of its label, an N400 effect can begin to emerge around 150 ms after word onset. Also, 
although Nref effects may last for over a second, their typical onset is around 300-400 ms. So, on the time-scale of 
rapid incremental language processing observations, these are not late effects. 
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Also relevant here is a recent ERP study (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2008) in which nouns 
embedded in a short story could be semantically anomalous, referentially ambiguous, or both (e.g., 
“The dean ate the lecturer” in a story about two equally salient lecturers). These doubly problematic 
nouns elicited a clear N400 effect, indicating a problem with how the coded meaning fit the story 
context. However, they did not elicit an Nref effect, presumably indicating that people did not 
engage in additional inferencing to disambiguate reference. Again, this seems to fit a standard story 
in which sense-dependent processing precedes (and sometimes preempts) referential computations.  
 
Of course, it is easy to come up with cases where referential concerns can in the end overrule coded 
meaning, as in “The museum felt that the old girl was historically unique” referring to a recently 
restored World War II Sherman tank (Van Berkum et al., 2007). Our current results do not speak to 
whether such referential modulations of word sense come about as part of later ‘postsemantic’ 
pragmatic computations (the standard Gricean account), or as part of rapid pragmatic intrusions. 
 
How does reference interact with syntax? 
 
As for how establishing reference interacts with syntax, the ERP evidence actually suggests a rapid 
bidirectional interaction. On the one hand, with two equally eligible antecedents in context, the 
basic Nref effect on singularly marked words like “lecturer” or “he” demonstrates that 
morphosyntax can constrain reference. On the other hand, two ERP studies in which we 
specifically explored the interaction of referential and syntactic analyses reveal that the former can 
sometimes also guide the latter. 
 
First, the ERP data indicate that if readers or listeners do not know who or what is being referred to, 
this can immediately affect their ongoing syntactic analysis (Van Berkum, Brown & Hagoort, 
1999a; 1999b). For instance, when “the lecturer” in “The dean told the lecturer that…” is 
referentially ambiguous, people tend to analyze the subsequent word “that” as starting a relative 
clause that will tell them which lecturer was meant (e.g., “…the lecturer that had committed 
plagiarism”) rather than as starting some other syntactic structure (e.g., “…that there was ample 
reason to sack him”). We know this is the case because if the sentence then continues with the latter 
after all, we see the typical ERP effect to a syntactic problem (the so-called P600 effect, see Figure 
1,). In fact, and critical here, the conceptual ‘pull’ of referential ambiguity is so strong that it can 
even briefly lure people into pursuing a relative clause analysis in cases where this is 
ungrammatical, prohibited by the gender of the relative pronoun (see Van Berkum et al., 1999b for 
details). Thus, reference can sometimes temporarily outweigh syntax. 
 
Another piece of evidence for the power of reference comes from an ERP study in which we 
examined the use of verb-based implicit causality information (Van Berkum et al., 2007). When 
asked to complete a sentence fragment such as “David praised Linda because...”, readers and 
listeners will be inclined to continue the sentence with something about Linda, e.g., “…because she 
had done well”. However, after “David apologized to Linda because...”, people tend to continue 
with something about David instead. In “person-1 VERB-ED person-2 because...” constructions, 
interpersonal verbs like “praise” and “apologize” thus supply information about whose behaviour 
or state is the more likely immediate cause of the event at hand. Because this information is 
conveyed implicitly as part of the meaning of the interpersonal verb, it is usually referred to as 
implicit causality. In our experiment, we tested how rapidly readers were using this probabilistic 
information to constrain their interpretation, this by continuing the sentence with a bias-inconsistent 
pronoun (9a), and comparing the processing at this pronoun to its bias-consistent control (9b).  
 
(9a)  David praised Linda because he…  
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(9b)  Linda praised David because he…  
 
As shown in Figure 4, bias-inconsistent pronouns elicited a P600 effect. As explained in detail 
elsewhere, we take this to indicate that as readers encountered the verb, their expectation for the 
sentence to continue with something about the person being praised was so strong that an 
expectation-inconsisten pronoun was momentarily taken as a syntactic error. In other words, 
readers briefly blamed the syntax. Note that the masculine pronoun is not only syntactically legal 
(as a free pronoun it can refer to any male entity), but it actually has a locally available antecedent. 
As with the previous study, this indicates that the combined force of semantic and referential 
factors can sometimes temporarily outweigh the syntax.  
 
*** figure 4 about here *** 
 
Now, syntax does probably win out in the end, in both of these studies. But that doesn’t mean that, 
as explicitly proposed by ‘syntax-first’ or ‘syntactocentric’ models (e.g., Friederici, 2002) and 
tacitly assumed in standard models of pragmatics, syntax is rigidly defining the playground for 
semantics and pragmatics at every moment of processing. Comprehenders are trying to deal with 
multiple levels of linguistic structure simultaneously, without always giving one of them absolute 
priority (cf. Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 2005; Jackendoff, 2007) 
 
 
(3) HOW DIRECTLY PRAGMATIC ARE THESE ERP EFFECTS? 
 
So, several ERP effects can tell us something about the immediate context-sensitivity of sentence 
understanding. But does this mean that these effects are direct signatures of pragmatic processes? 
And if so, which ones? Little is known about about the Nref effect so far, and I will only briefly 
address it here. However, we know enough of the N400 to examine the case more thoroughly. As 
will be seen, the issue is complex and, hence, its treatment relatively lengthy. With an increasing 
number of experimental pragmaticists getting ready to conduct their first ERP experiments, 
however, making the N400 - pragmatics link explicit should in the end pay off.  
 
Of course, the question presupposes that we know how pragmatic processing is organized, 
internally and relative to semantic processing -- the very issues hotly debated in pragmatics and 
semantics. A practical approach is to start from what seems more or less the standard view, and 
take it from there. The standard view (see, e.g., Levinson, 2000, Figure 3.1; Garrett & Harnish, 
2007, Figure 1) is that utterances such as “I finally managed to rewrite that difficult paper” have a 
timeless, context-invariant ‘sentence meaning’ (‘coded meaning’), computed by retrieving 
relatively stable word meanings from lexical memory and combining them in a grammatically 
constrained, structured higher-order representation. The result of such lexicon- and grammar-driven 
sense-making is still a very incomplete representation of the meaning of an utterance. Amongst the 
additional mechanisms required to arrive at something more useful are mechanisms for contextual 
disambiguation (e.g., what is the relevant sense of “difficult” or “paper”), for fixing reference 
(who’s speaking, and which paper?), and for refining, expanding, or otherwise enriching the 
contents of what is said (so that, for example, the meaning of “some of the guests have left” is 
expanded with “but not all of them”, and such that “the ham sandwich at table six” can be taken to 
refer to a customer). Furthermore, at some point listeners will go beyond what is said and recover 
the conversational implicatures, i.e., infer what the speaker really meant (e.g., “John’s command of 
English is excellent” can be taken to mean that John is a mediocre student, that he would make a 
fine translator, that he understood something he heard, or that he has no excuse for the sloppy paper 




Which of the many mechanisms involved are directly responsible for generating the N400 and Nref 
effects reviewed here? For simplicity – and glossing over many alternative ways to draw the lines 
here – let me group them into (1) semantic memory retrieval, (2) semantic composition, (3) 
contextual enrichment, and (4) recovering implicatures. To foreshadow the analysis, I will argue 
that the N400 most likely reflects semantic memory retrieval, and that the Nref effect might more 
directly reflect pragmatic inferences, in this case involved in the enrichment of what is said. 
 
The N400 effect: some important additional observations 
 
A tacit working assumption underneath most of the N400 studies reviewed in section 1 was that the 
N400 directly indexes a difficulty in incrementally constructing the structured conceptual 
representations that are at the heart of language comprehension (see Jackendoff, 2007, for a 
concrete idea of such conceptual structure building). Listeners who have heard enough of “tattoo” 
to retrieve its meaning from long-term memory, for example, would find it more difficult to merge 
this information with the structured conceptual representation built for “I have a big” spoken in a 
stereotypically ‘upper-class’ accent than with the representation built for “I have a big” spoken in a 
stereotypically ‘lower-class’ accent. The hypothesis that the amplitude of the N400 directly reflects 
the difficulty in semantic composition (and perhaps aspects of contextual enrichment, e.g., word 
sense disambiguation) is often referred to as the “integration view” (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000).  
 
The pragmatic N400 effects reviewed in section 1 are sometimes taken to strongly support this 
integration hypothesis, and to exclude other possibilities. However, there is an important alternative 
reading of the N400 that can also account for these observations. According to the semantic 
memory retrieval hypothesis (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Kutas et al., 2006), “N400 amplitude is a 
general index of the ease or difficulty of retrieving stored conceptual knowledge associated with a 
word (or other meaningful stimuli), which is dependent on both the stored representation itself, and 
the retrieval cues provided by the preceding context” (Kutas et al., 2006, p. 669). This account 
holds that, after for example having heard “I have a big” in a stereotypically ‘upper-class’ accent 
(instead of a more ‘common’ accent), listeners find it more difficult to retrieve the meaning of 
“tattoo” from long-term memory.  
 
If integration and memory retrieval are inextricably intertwined, just two sides of the same coin 
(see Coulson & Federmeier, in press, for such a proposal), the difference between adopting either 
hypothesis about the N400 doesn’t matter all that much. However, nature may not be that 
accommodating. Also, with complex information-processing systems that make use of long-term 
memory to preserve and abstract over instances of past computations, the distinction between 
memory retrieval and dynamic computation (‘integration’) seems difficult to avoid.  
 
Unfortunately, neither the memory retrieval account nor the integration account of the N400 
component is particularly well-specified. For example, under the memory retrieval hypothesis, 
what remains to be specified is how exactly rich pragmatic context can facilitate or hinder retrieval 
of word meanings. Also, under the integration hypothesis, one can ask which of the many 
components jointly contributing to sentence and speaker meaning should be associated with the 
N400. Because psycholinguistic N400 research has by and large not made much contact with 
modern semantic and pragmatic theory (nor, for that matter, with theories about general memory), 
the latter questions are yet to be thoroughly addressed. Several empirical observations about the 
N400 seem immediately relevant, though.  
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First, N400 effects can also be obtained by semantically odd combinations that are non-linguistic, 
such as an unexpected turn of events in a film clip (e.g., a guy in front of the bathroom mirror 
putting shaving cream on his chin, and then picking up a rolling pin; Sitnikova, Kuperberg & 
Holcomb, 2003; Sitnikova, Holcomb, Kiyonaga, & Kuperberg, 2008) or a cartoon-like picture 
sequence (West & Holcomb, 2002). Although one could perhaps make an argument that such 
materials, offered to participants in the context of an experiment, are in a sense acts of ostensive 
communication, interpreting a result like this as uniquely and directly reflecting the computation of 
Gricean speaker meaning seems a little far-fetched. Instead, the result suggests that the N400 is 
more generally sensitive to meaning, regardless of whether it involves ‘non-natural’ speaker 
meaning or non-communicative ‘natural meaning’. These non-linguistic N400 effects do tend to 
have a somewhat more anterior distribution than their word-elicited counterparts. But this variation 
is generally taken to reflects differences in where in the brain the relevant conceptual information is 
represented, rather than differences in the fundamental nature of the processes reflected by the 
N400 (e.g. Kutas & Federmeier, 2000).  
 
Second, N400 effects begin to emerge around 150 ms into the spoken word, after having heard only 
two or three phonemes, and often well before the spoken word has become acoustically unique 
(e.g., Van Petten, Coulson, Rubin, Plante & Parks, 1999; Van Berkum et al., 2003; Van Den Brink, 
Brown, & Hagoort, 2006). A related finding is that words embedded in other spoken words, such as 
“pay” and “pain” in “champaign”, modulate the word-elicited N400 as a function of their fit to the 
sentential context (Van Alphen & Van Berkum, submitted). It is not impossible to imagine two or 
perhaps more parallel drafts of coded meaning being considered simultaneously (see Jackendoff, 
2007, for an example), so these findings by themselves do not speak against the N400 being 
uniquely tied to semantic composition or relatively resource-free aspects of contextual enrichment. 
However, it seems less likely to suppose that listeners incrementally embark on Gricean inferencing 
to compute conversational implicatures for each of many possible words simultaneously.  
 
Third, N400 effects can occur automatically, in situations where people are not aware of the fact 
that a communicative stimulus is presented to them. For example, when subliminally presented 
target words like “table” cannot be consciously identified, and therefore elicit random semantic 
category decisions, these words nevertheless elicit an N400 effect when primed with the wrong 
semantic category (e.g., body part vs. furniture; Stenberg, Lindgren, Johansson, Olsson, & Rosén, 
2000). Again, although in the end depending on how automatic Gricean inferencing is, it seems 
unlikely that such effects are the consequence of, say, inferring a conversational implicature.  
 
Finally, the amplitude of the N400 is sensitive to lexical or lexico-conceptual factors such as 
repetition, word frequency, associative word-word priming, the number of orthographically similar 
words, and concreteness (see Kutas et al., 2006 for review), factors that have little to do with 
semantic structure composition, contextual enrichment or implicature derivation. For example, 
when words are presented in isolation, outside of any remotely communicative context, a rare word 
elicits a larger N400 than a frequently occuring word (e.g., Van Petten & Kutas, 1990). Also, the 
first presentation of a word in such lists elicits a larger N400 than the second presentation (e.g., Van 
Petten, Kutas, Kluender, Mitchiner & McIsaac, 1991). And a word with many orthographic 
neighbors – such as “dime”, which resembles “time”, “lime”, “dine”, “dame”, “dome” etcetera –  
elicits a larger N400 than a word with only few neighbors (e.g., Holcomb, Grainger, & O'Rourke, 
2002). Although the impact of such factors is often attenuated and sometimes even eliminated in 
richer contexts, the fact that they modulate the N400 speaks against an account in which the N400 
critically hinges on semantic composition, contextual enrichment, or inferring implicatures. 




This analysis suggests that the integration view, when formulated in terms of structure-sensitive 
compositional, enriching and/or inferential processes, cannot be the right story. The memory 
retrieval perspective proposed by Kutas and colleagues (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Kutas et al., 
2006) appears to be in a much better position to explain both the context-dependent and the just 
mentioned lexical observations.  
 
However, within the standard retrieval account, a handful of additional N400 observations remain 
difficult to handle. First, the N400 is also increased when the word’s coded meaning has strong 
valence. For example, value-laden words in otherwise neutral stories elicit enhanced N400 
responses (Holt et al., in press), and so do words that in particular sentential contexts clash with 
one’s personal value system (Van Berkum et al., submitted). Furthermore, the N400 has been found 
to increase when coherent words are accented (Li, Hagoort, & Yang, 2008), and when coherent 
words are preceded by a hesitation (Corley, McGregor & Donaldson, 2007), suggesting that apart 
from valence, a marked delivery also attracts deeper semantic processing. Conversely, the impact 
of anomalous words on the N400 can apparently be eliminated under certain shallow-processing 
conditions, such as when they are scenario-relevant and prosodically unstressed, i.e., presented as 
given information (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2005). For example, in a story about a tourist and a 
stewardess arguing over an overweight suitcase, offhandedly pronounced severe anomalies such as 
“The stewardess told the suitcase to…” did not elicit an N400 effect (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 
2005). What seems to be needed is an account in which the retrieval of a word’s ‘coded’ meaning 
indexed by the N400 is not just modulated by contextual expectations, but can also be regulated by 
such things as focus, a marked delivery or its relevance to values.  
 
The multiple-cause intensified retrieval (MIR) hypothesis 
 
Taken together, the above observations lead me to the following hypothesis for how the N400 
relates to language interpretation: 
 
(1) INTENSIFIED RETRIEVAL OF STORED CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE. The amplitude of the word-
elicited N400 reflects the computational resources used in retrieving the relatively invariant 
‘coded’ meaning(s) stored in semantic long-term memory5 for, and made available by, the word at 
hand. In non-communicative settings, such as with a video of a man preparing to shave and then 
picking up a rolling pin, the object- or event-elicited N400 effect analogously reflects the additional 
computational resources needed to retrieve the object’s or event’s natural meaning. 
 
(2) MULTIPLE CAUSES OF INTENSIFIED MEMORY RETRIEVAL. At least two different factors can cause 
word-elicited semantic memory retrieval to become more resource-intensive.  
 
(a) CONTEXTUALLY DISFAVORED FEATURES. One is the mismatch between the word-generated 
coded meaning(s) and expectations raised by the relevant interpretive context at the time the 
word is read or heard (the typical trigger in standard N400 mismatch experiments). Relative 
to contextually favored features, the retrieval of contextually unsupported features will 
simply be more difficult. This is because of how long-term memory works: with converging 
retrieval cues from both the prior/wider context and the current word, information stored in 
long-term memory is more easily brought to bear on dynamic computation, but with 
divergent or even conflicting cues, retrieval will be harder (I will return to this later).  
                                                 
5 The semantic long-term memory discussed here is conceptual memory in the broadest sense. This includes semantic 
knowledge narrowly defined (e.g., as a basic network of concepts, or a set of feature lists), but also far more richly 
structured knowledge, including such things as how to behave at a thesis defense ceremony and why, the turbulent 
history of Cuba, typical steps in replacing a harddisk, and, say, the narrative conventions respected in cartoons. 
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(b)  RELEVANCE SIGNALS. However, semantic retrieval can also be intensified if certain 
‘relevance signals’ indicate the need for deeper or more detailed processing. Such signals 
include the strong valence associated with the word’s coded meaning in a particular context, 
a marked delivery (e.g., linguistic focus, uncommon choice of words, a pre-word hesitation), 
and quite likely also the detection of unexpected meaning itself. The additional effort 
invested in semantic memory retrieval in these cases presumably involves the retrieval of a 
richer set of semantic features and associations from the semantic memory representation of 
the word at hand. However, a more elaborate memory resampling of the coded meaning of 
mismatching contextual concepts can also not be excluded. 
 
(3) MULTIPLE CAUSES FOR CONTEXTUAL EXPECTATIONS -- THE INTERPRETIVE BACKGROUND AS A 
MIXED BAG. A wide variety of information sources can contribute to the interpretive background 
against which the next word comes in. This mixed bag can include: (a) associatively or 
semantically related prime words, (b) scenario-based knowledge about the world activated by (one 
or more words in) the preceding text, (c) a mental representation of the sensory context, e.g., visual 
or auditory scene, (d) the coded and contextualally enriched meaning – “what is said” – computed 
for the unfolding sentence heard so far, (e) the Gricean speaker meaning – “what is meant” – 
inferred for the unfolding sentence heard so far, (f) a mental model of the situation being discussed, 
and (g) some metalinguistic representation of the discourse, e.g. its register, the interlocutors 
involved, and the goals being pursued. All of this can raise conceptual expectations that can be met 
by the next word to varying degrees, with a better fit giving a smaller N400. In section 4, I return to 
the mechanism(s) underneath such expectations. 
 
So how about pragmatics, then? 
 
Note that in the MIR hypothesis, claim (3) is what links the N400 to pragmatics – but only 
indirectly. In particular, what I propose is that pragmatic modulations of the N400 come about not 
because the N400 at hand directly reflects a rich compositional-semantic and/or Gricean analysis to 
make sense of the word’s coded meaning in this particular context, but simply because the semantic 
and pragmatic (speaker meaning, situation model update, etc.) implications of the preceding words 
have already been computed, and, together with other immediately available cues (such as the 
visual scene) now simply define a less or more helpful interpretive background within which to 
retrieve (or select a suitable) coded meaning for the critical word.  
 
This proposal raises an interesting question. If the word-elicited N400 itself reflects the early 
retrieval of invariant meaning from long-term memory, and if pragmatic inferences can only shape 
contextually defined expectations giving rise to N400 mismatch effects, how far does this remove 
us from the “integration account” of this component, the idea that the N400 directly indexes the 
incremental construction of a sensible interpretation for the unfolding utterance? For reasons 
discussed above, the N400 is unlikely to directly index semantic composition and enrichment in the 
compositional structure-sensitive sense of, say, Jackendoff (2007), or the algorithmic derivation of 
speaker meaning based on Gricean rules (Levinson, 2000; Wilson & Sperber, 2004). But note that 
like other animals, we can also make sense of the world around us in a way that does not depend on 
things like recursion, variable binding, operator scope, or precise scalar implicatures. Such sense-
making is presumably intricately intertwined, perhaps even identical, with the cued retrieval of 
stored conceptual information from our content-addressable semantic (and episodic) long term 
memory. And surely this more general memory-based sense-making system will not be switched 
off in humans just because they also happen to have compositional semantics and Gricean 
pragmatics (cf. Kuperberg, 2007, for a similar two-stream perspective). So in this particular way, I 
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think a memory retrieval account of the word-elicited N400 can actually be equated with sense-
making or ‘integration’.  
 
The core of the MIR proposal is that the N400 directly reflects whatever sense-making is achieved 
through ‘primitive’ memory-based analysis (pattern recognition and pattern completion, if you 
will), but only indirectly reflects the sense-making involved in more ‘refined’ structure-sensitive 
dynamic composition of the type studied in semantics and pragmatics (simply because the resulting 
structured representations serve as retrieval cues to semantic long-term memory). This indirectness 
does not necessarily diminish the utility of this ERP component for exploring the pragmatics of 
language interpretation. For example, the findings reviewed in section 1 unequivocally show that 
various types of extra-sentential context (prior text, speaker knowledge, one’s value system) are 
rapidly assimilated into a rich mental representation of the relevant context, such that they pave the 
way for retrieving the next word’s coded meaning to a systematically different degree. However, 
because the proximal cause of the N400 effect is most likely intensified memory retrieval, not the 
difficulty of composing a semantic structure or of inferring speaker meaning, experimenters must 
be careful to exclude other factors that might affect such retrieval, such as word frequency, word 
repetition, or various forms of simple priming from other words in the context.  
 
An example serves to make the point. ERP studies on truth value have yielded inconsistent N400 
results. In some studies, the N400 has been shown to be highly sensitive to whether statements 
were true (e.g., “Dutch trains are yellow”) or false (e.g., “Dutch trains are white”, Hagoort et al., 
2004; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, in press). However, in a classic study involving negation (Fischler, 
Bloom, Childers, Roucos & Perry, 1983), critical sentence-final words in true (“A robin is a bird”) 
and false statements (“A robin is not a bird”) elicited comparable N400 responses (see Kounios & 
Holcomb, 1992, and Noveck & Posada, 2003, for related findings). I suggest that this variability 
actually comes about because of how simple and complex aspects of the context ‘balance out’ in 
cueing and hence facilitating the word-induced retrieval of relevant meaning. In the Hagoort et al. 
study, the concept of “Dutch trains” or – for Dutch listeners –  even just “trains” joins forces with 
the precise compositional meaning of “Dutch trains are…” to suggest a limited set of potentially 
relevant concepts, which includes “yellow” but not “white”. In the Fischler er al. study, however, 
the concept “robin”, a presumably excellent retrieval cue for “bird”, competes with the precise 
compositional meaning of  “A robin is not a…”. Also, because of the way the Fischler et al. 
experiment and materials were set up, precise compositional meaning may not have exerted the 
effect one might expect in ordinary language use (see Nieuwland & Kuperberg, in press, for 
arguments and evidence for the latter). Thus, the absence of truth-value effects on the N400 
observed by Fischler and colleagues may well have resulted from weak sentence-level semantic 
retrieval cues being overruled by very strong local lexical retrieval cues. 
 
Urgent maintenance required 
 
Much like the former Russian space station, the MIR account is patchy, with most of its 
components needing an upgrade fast. First, the explanatory power that comes from the wide variety 
of potentially effective contextual retrieval cues (‘context as a mixed bag’) has a downside: N400 
predictions for a specific experiment now depend on a precise account of how these many factors 
are weighed, given the materials at hand. Second, it remains to be seen whether the account can be 
sensibly extended to accommodate the functionally distinct N400 phenomena revealed by initially 
presenting information to the left or right hemisphere only (cf. Federmeier, 2007), or other recent 
suggestions that the N400 is actually a composite effect reflecting a complex network of neural 
sources (e.g., Halgren, Dhond, Christensen, Van Petten, Marinkovic, Lewine & Dale, 2002). Note 
that a unifying concept like “intensified memory retrieval” is not necessarily at odds with the N400 
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being generated by a network of brain areas; what matters is whether what the network is doing fits 
the bill. But such precise mapping remains to be done. 
 
Third, a core components of the account, intensified retrieval, remains to be specified in detail. One 
place to look for such details is in general models of long-term memory (computational and neuro-
biological), an issue I will briefly return to in section 4. Another avenue – possibly ending up in the 
same place – is to exploit and further develop ideas about attentional control and depth of semantic 
analysis currently used to explain shallow processing and ‘semantic illusions’. Behavioral research 
has shown that readers and listeners sometimes overlook severe semantic anomalies in language, 
even when asked to look for them (see Sanford & Sturt, 2002, for review). For example, after 
having been told about a plane crash right on the border between France and Italy, many people 
overlook the severe anomaly in “The authorities were trying to decide where to bury the survivors”. 
What seems critical here is that (a) the context activates a strong scenario, (b) the impostor word – 
survivors – fits the scenario, (c) the impostor word is semantically related to the acceptable word – 
victims – it replaces, and (d) the impostor word is not marked as particularly noteworthy by 
linguistic focus, such as prosodic stress, italics, or cleft-constructions (e.g., “It was the survivors 
that…” ; Sanford, Sanford, Molle, & Emmott, 2006). To account for these phenomena, it has been 
suggested (e.g., Sanford & Garrod, 2005) that comprehenders can adapt the depth (precision, 
specificity, ‘grain size’) to which they analyze the meaning of a word, and that for deeper analyzed 
words, more semantic detail is retrieved from semantic memory. Such partly focus-controlled 
modulations of ‘retrieval grain size’ could well be part of what it means to intensify retrieval. 
 
The Nref effect 
 
So what about the frontally sustained Nref effect? Several indications could be taken to suggest 
that, in contrast to the N400, the Nref effect is a direct reflection of context-dependent ‘pragmatic’ 
inferencing, in this case presumably engaged in to determine the most suitable referent. First, 
readers with high verbal working memory capacity or ‘reading span’, who are known to engage in 
more inferential activity (Linderholm, 2002), generate larger Nref effects than readers with more 
limited capacity (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006b). Second, in our fMRI study, referential 
ambiguity selectively engaged medial frontal regions often related to mentalizing and/or other 
inferential activity (see Nieuwland, Petersson & Van Berkum, 2007, for details). Third, the timing 
seems to be right. Whereas N400 effects begin to emerge somewhere between 150-300 ms, the 
Nref effects observed sofar typically begin to develop around 300-400 ms (sometimes much later), 
and often last to at least 1200 ms. Fourth, as might be expected from an ERP effect reflecting 
sophisticated inference-making, the Nref effect seems to be elicited only in cases where there is 
deep ambiguity at the level of the situation model – what matters is not whether two discourse 
entities have merely been mentioned, but whether both of them qualify as referents given the details 
of the situation model and of the unfolding current utterance (Nieuwland et al., 2007). All this fits 
with the idea that whereas N400 effects index the early and in terms of memory mechanisms fairly 
‘dumb’ resonance-based retrieval of coded word meanings, Nref effects may reflect (some aspect 
of) the fairly sophisticated inferential activity needed to sort out subsequent problems. 
 
A final caution: although the complexities involved in constructing meaning for language suggests 
that we may well end up with more than two relevant ERP effects, it is not the case that every one 
of the distinctions discovered in semantics and pragmatics must show up in the ERP signal. All we 
can say is that the processes or representations postulated as effective ingredients of real language 
use should at some level map onto specific neural dynamics. Whether those neural dynamics are 




(4) THE ANTICIPATING LANGUAGE USER  
 
Taking a design perspective, Levinson (2000) has noted that, because normal speech has a rather 
low data transfer rate (under 0.1 kbit/s, i.e., ~50,000 times as slow as the average ADSL download 
rate), it makes sense to offload the communication channel by rapid thinking. The general idea is 
that what can be reliably inferred need not be expressed, allowing us to get away with, say, “he” 
instead of “the fraudulous lecturer that I just talked about before”, or with “Some of the guest left” 
instead of “Some of the guests, but not all of them, left the party”. Of course, if the inferencing 
required to recover speaker meaning from coded meaning needs to take into account all the tiny 
little details of the specific current context, it might be slow (so the argument goes), and as such of 
little help in solving the communicative bottleneck problem. Against this background, Levinson 
proposes a set of pragmatic heuristics, shared by speakers and listeners, that can very rapidly 
deliver plausible ‘default’ enrichments, without the need to carefully peruse the current context and 
engage in situation-specific, customized ‘nonce’ inferencing (as hypothesized in Relevance Theory, 
Wilson & Sperber, 2004).  
 
Readiness is all — anticipating potentially relevant meaning 
 
However, although Levinson’s argument from design is compelling with respect to the need for 
quick inferencing, the associated case against exclusively relying on situation-specific, customized 
inferences may not be as strong as it seems. Note that such customized inferences may work a lot 
better if, next to what is said, the information needed to enrich the coded meaning and derive 
speaker meaning happens to be sufficiently available at the right time. And if the required 
information is ready, who knows how long a context-sensitive, customized inference really takes?  
 
A central idea in the so-called memory-based text processing tradition (e.g., Gerrig & McKoon, 
1998; Gerrig & O'Brien, 2005) is readiness, the timely availability of plausibly relevant 
information. Firmly based in general models of human memory (e.g., Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988), 
research in this tradition has shown that as we read though a text, potentially relevant additional 
information waxes and wanes without cost, as a function of how our content-addressable long-term 
memory passively ‘resonates’ to currently active representations (Myers & O’Brien, 1998). 
Specifically, active representations in working memory simply act as memory cues for information 
in long-term memory, and associated information – from general world knowledge as well as 
inactive portions of discourse memory – is made available for further processing automatically.  
 
Importantly, although active representations that serve as retrieval cues can be simple (e.g., a single 
word), they can also be highly complex and involve the combination of many different bits of 
information (‘compound cues’). Of particular relevance here, many inferences that seem to rely on 
sophisticated active processing, including anaphoric, bridging, causal and predictive inferences, can 
actually come for free as a function of convergent memory retrieval cues (see Gerrig & O’Brien, 
2005, for review). Even something as complex as current common ground has been argued to 
virtually come for free in this framework, as the information that is automatically rendered more 
available by combining the linguistic and other currently active retrieval cues with the current 
interlocutor as a retrieval cue (Gerrig & McKoon, 1998). 
 
Although the cues can be complex, the resonance process itself is sometimes referred to as ‘dumb’, 
because the information made ‘ready’ may not be what is needed – after all, the system essentially 
does automatic pattern recognition and pattern completion, not reasoning over structured 
representations. Models of text processing therefore usually postulate resonance-based memory 
retrieval as a first step only, with its cost-free suggestions being taken up or pruned away by more 
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sophisticated compositional and inferential sense-making processes (see, e.g., Kintsch, 1998). 
Translated to distinctions used here, the more precise computations involved in compositional 
semantics, contextual enrichment and implicature derivation rely on (and incrementally drive) 
resonance-based dumb memory retrieval, but by no means reduce to them.  
 
I think it is exactly this readiness function of our content-addressable long-term memory that is 
behind the contextual expectations discussed in the MIR and other memory retrieval accounts of 
context-based N400 effects (Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Federmeier, 2007). When combined with 
by “I have a big”, a stereotypically ‘upper-class’ accent simply increases the availability of things 
that people with posh accents tend to have (expensive cars, cigars, an attitude), at the expense of 
things they do not tend to have (a Fiat Uno, or a tattoo). Similarly for classic N400-inducing 
sentences such as “He buttered the bread with…” or “He ate the…”, which increase the readiness 
of specific or generally edible items respectively. And likewise for “The dean told the lecturer that 
there was ample reason to…”, which in a story about a swindling lecturer will increase the 
readiness of concepts involving grave consequences (being reprimanded or fired), at the expense of 
happier concepts (e.g., being praised or promoted).6  
 
One can of course debate whether the passive, dumb pattern recognition and pattern completion 
functionality afforded by our content-addressable long-term memories should be called ‘prediction’ 
or ‘anticipation’ proper – some may want to reserve those terms for a more active, ‘intentional’ 
mode of operation. However, it qualifies as anticipation in several ways. First, meaning is 
essentially about being able to predict (cf. Altmann, 1997), so to the extent that our content-
addressable memory automatically increases the availability (readiness) of conceptually associated 
information in response to what we read or hear in a given context, we are essentially anticipating. 
Second, rational analyses of long-term memory (e.g., Schooler & Anderson, 1997) suggest that 
long-term memory processes are optimized to generate information that is needed in the immediate 
future. The idea that our long-term memory is fundamentally geared to anticipating future 
information needs also resonates with recent neuroscience thinking about the role of memory in 
predicting the future, rather than ruminating over the past (e.g., Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007).  
 
Whether this should or should not be called anticipation is perhaps a terminological issue. But the 
point here is this: to the extent that our brains are great at having relevant enriching information 
ready at just the right time (possibly even in terms of what is in common ground and what is not), 
context-sensitive customized inferences about what the speaker intends to convey may not be so 
hard to draw. In fact, some of the inferences may actually be achieved via richly cued long-term 
memory retrieval, in which case they come cheap and fast. What then remains of Levinson’s 
systems design argument for hard-coded general heuristics, contra customized inferencing, remains 
to be seen. These default heuristics may well be necessary for other reasons – I lack the expertise 
needed to assess this. What I can say, though, is that there is more than one way to at least partly 
bypass the transmission bottleneck in human communication. Context-insensitive heuristics that 
rapidly deliver default interpretations can help. But a conceptual long-term memory that voluntarily 
offers enriching information on the fly, at just the right time, can be a big help too.  
 
Anticipating upcoming communication 
                                                 
6 I prefer the terms ‘resonance’ and ‘readiness’ over ‘priming’ because, following early models of semantic memory, 
the latter is usually associated with links between simple units, like doctor-nurse. However, in modern models of 
memory, highly complex structured combinations of cues can also retrieve or ‘prime’ stored information. To recognize 
the need for this, just think about the fact that a particular sequence of events, or a complexely structured scene, can 
bring something to mind. Furthermore, what is brought to mind need not be simple either. Rich structure can retrieve 




Beyond the conceptual anticipation reflected in N400 effects, there is also strong ERP evidence that 
interlocutors anticipate upcoming communication. First, as we saw before, an unfolding utterance 
such as “David praised Linda because” raises strong expectations as to who will be talked about 
next, a prediction so strong that a perfectly legal subsequent “he” is briefly taken as a syntactic 
error (Van Berkum et al., 2007). Second, other ERP experiments convincingly show that people go 
beyond this, to routinely anticipate specific upcoming words. In one of these experiments (Van 
Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005), participants listened to (Dutch) mini-
stories such as (10a), which in a paper-and-pencil cloze test were predominantly completed with 
one particular critical noun (in this case, “painting”, the Dutch translation of which is a neuter-
gender word). To test whether such discourse-based lexical prediction would also occur ‘on-line’ as 
part of real-time language comprehension, the EEG participants would at this point first hear a 
gender-inflected adjective whose syntactic gender either agreed with the anticipated noun, as in 
(10b) or did not agree with this expected noun, as in (10c)  
 
(10a) The burglar had no trouble locating the secret family safe. Of course, it was situated behind a… 
(10b)  … bigNEU but rather unobtrusive paintingNEU 
(10c)  … bigCOM but rather unobtrusive bookcaseCOM.  
 
Relative to the gender-congruent prenominal adjective in (10b), the gender-incongruent adjective in 
(10c) elicited a small but reliable ERP effect right at the inflection, illustrated in Figure 5. Because 
this prediction effect hinged on the idiosyncratic (hence memorized) syntactic gender of an 
expected but not yet presented noun, it suggested that discourse-level information can indeed lead 
people to anticipate specific upcoming words ‘on-line’, as a local sentence unfolds. In addition, the 
fact that such prediction could be probed via syntactic gender agreement suggested that the 
syntactic properties of those anticipated ‘ghost’ words can immediately begin to interact with 
locally unfolding syntactic constraints, such as the gender inflection on a prenominal adjective. In 
follow-up research (Otten & Van Berkum, in press; Otten, Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2007), we 
examined whether these discourse-based predictions were being driven by a true message-level 
representation of the discourse (as had been assumed by Van Berkum et al., 2005), or whether they 
could be reduced to some simpler mechanism involving scenario-based or convergent lexical 
priming. The ERP results actually suggest that in the agreement-sensitive paradigms used here, 
predictions critically hinge on the precise message conveyed so far.  
 
*** figure 5 about here *** 
 
Together with other evidence from ERPs (Delong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005; Nieuwland & Van 
Berkum, 2006a; Wicha, Moreno & Kutas, 2004) and behavioral methods (Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 
2005; De Ruiter, Mitterer & Enfield, 2006), these experiments show that readers and listeners don’t 
just passively sit back and enjoy the show, but actively anticipate what their interlocutor is going to 
say next. This may seem odd, for the generativity of language allows interlocutors to say lots of 
things. But in ordinary rich context, and illustrated by the fact that we can successfully finish other 
people’s sentences, interlocutors are in fact not entirely unpredictable. Furthermore, although the 
mechanisms underneath this type of prediction are currently debated, much of it may again come 




Theories in pragmatics usually focus on making sense of what is said, not on what will be said. 
However, the speed with which language users successfully make sense of rather underspecified 
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utterances suggests that they are in fact doing some preparatory thinking. In line with behavioral 
studies, the ERP evidence discussed here demonstrates that readers and listeners routinely look 
ahead. They anticipate relevant meaning as well as upcoming communication. Moreover, the basis 
for such anticipation far exceeds simple word-word priming of the doctor-nurse type. As suggested 
by behavioral research in the memory-based text processing tradition, as well as by more recent 
neurocognitive work on memory, it may well be that human long-term memory functions do most 
of the work here, cleverly, for free, and fast. Such considerations directly bear on central arguments 
in pragmatic theory, such as whether language users need a limited set of special fast-acting 
heuristics to compute speaker meaning (Levinson, 2000) or can instead make do with more 
ideosyncratic context-sensitive  inferencing (Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Furthermore, if we’re lucky, 
understanding how memory works can help solve a related problem, which is to understand which 
subset of the vast knowledge people have about the world, their own past, their goals, the current 





ERP evidence on how narrative and speaker context affects the real-time processing of simple 
sentences directly bears on a central topic in pragmatics. Linguistics, psychology, and neuroscience 
all study the same system in the end – albeit at different levels –  and matters are too complex to 
disregard potentially relevant evidence from whatever neighboring discipline. Furthermore, when 
pragmatic theories become partly grounded in analyses of what the human brain can and cannot do 
(cf. Levinson, 2000), one might as well have a closer look at the extant cognitive and cognitive 
neuroscience data anyway. The interdisciplinary flow of information should go both ways, of 
course, and I think that – even if ultimately incorrect – the N400 analysis in this chapter makes the 
point: theoretical distinctions used in pragmatics (and semantics) may help us understand the brain 
signals we pick up. Over the past few years, it slowly dawned upon me that, for all its high-tech 
tools and its ability to ‘look under the hood’, the cognitive neuroscience of language interpretation 
by and large wasn’t making as much progress and impact as it might have. Apart from being 
bogged down by historically determined perennial questions (e.g., modularity) and relatively 
accidental research traditions – something any decent research program can get stuck in – I think a 
major cause for this delay in progress and impact is its relative detachment from research in 
linguistics and classic experimental psychology. If my analysis is correct, then the emerging 
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Figure 1: From left to right: An Nref effect to a discourse-induced referential problem (in the 2-
referent version of the story, “lecturer” is ambiguous), a P600 effect to a discourse-induced 
syntactic problem (the provisional relative-clause analysis temporarily pursued at “that” in the 2-
referent context is subsequently ruled out by “there”), and an N400 effect to a discourse-induced 
semantic problem (“promote” does not fit the wider story context). The example item is shown here 
in several variants (1- and 2-referent contexts, coherent/anomalous ending), but any one participant 
saw just a single version. ERP waveforms are time-locked to the presentation of the written critical 
word (0 msec) and are shown for 1200 msec each. Negative voltage is up in this and all following 
figures. All data were obtained in a single reading experiment (see Van Berkum, Brown & Hagoort, 
1999a; Van Berkum, Hagoort & Brown, 1999).  
 
 
Figure 2: ERPs to words whose meaning did (solid) or did not (dotted) easily fit voice-based 
inferences about the speaker, pooled across three speaker dimensions. Speaker-mismatching words 
elicited a small but reliable N400 effect. Acoustic onset of the critical word is at 0 ms.  
 
 
Figure 3: ERPs to value-consistent (solid) and value-inconsistent (dotted) critical words in opinion 
poll statements, for members of a relatively strict Dutch Christian party (left), as well as a non-
religious control group with opposing moral value systems. Morally objectionable words are 
rapidly perceived as emotionally aversive (LPP effect) and affect the ongoing semantic analysis 
(N400 effect); the two effects partially overlap and, because of their opposite polarity, partially 
cancel out each other. Written word onset is at 0 ms.  
 
 
Figure 4: ERPs to singular pronouns whose gender-marking was consistent (solid) or inconsistent 
(dotted) with the implicit causality bias of a preceding verb. Bias-inconsistent pronouns elicit a 
P600 effect, suggesting that the semantic/referential bias briefly caused readers to blame the syntax. 
Onset of the written pronoun is at 0 msec. 
 
 
Figure 5: Left: The ERP effect to spoken adjectives whose morphosyntactic gender suffix did not 
match discourse-based expectations for specific upcoming nouns (e.g. the neuter Dutch equivalent 
of “painting”, preceded by a prenominal adjective with common gender suffix). Right: The N400 
effect elicited by the actual spoken nouns presented later in the sentence, with a coherent but less 
expected noun (e.g., “bookcase”) eliciting a much larger N400 than the discourse-predictable noun 





In dismay, the faculty dean called the lecturer and the professor (the two lecturers) 
to his office. This was because the lecturer (one of the lecturers) had committed 
plagiarism, and the professor (the other one) had faked some of his research data. 
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ERP effects of discourse-based prediction of upcoming words
